



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**MANAGING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING
SYSTEMS AT SMALL AGENCY POLICE DEPARTMENTS**

by

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September 2012

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**MANAGING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING SYSTEMS AT SMALL
AGENCY POLICE DEPARTMENTS**

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ABSTRACT

Law enforcement agencies have managed anonymous tip line programs for decades whereby community members can submit suspected criminal activity to their local law enforcement agency. As a result of the increasing threat of terrorism in the United States, suspicious activity reporting programs (SAR) accompany the traditional anonymous tip line. SARs include the reporting of suspicious behavior related to terrorism, as well as other criminal activity.

SAR programs have been adopted by federal, state and local jurisdictions and at state and regional fusion centers. Homeland security is a shared responsibility of the American public and SAR programs are a mechanism that allows the public to contribute to this country's security.

Smaller law enforcement agencies in the United States lack the resources of larger police departments. The research set out to determine if smaller police agencies lacked SAR programs, which thus might create a gap in U.S. overall homeland security. An audit of 355 California police department websites that serve populations from 10,000 to over one million revealed that 5.9% of the agencies supported an online SAR program. To verify the audit, 117 of the police departments were contacted and three of the agencies or 2.6% supported a SAR program accessible by the public either by a direct phone line or by some other means.

The thesis presents research to identify best practices for establishing SAR programs in police departments. The research explores national strategy documents, privacy and civil liberties guidelines and national SAR standards. The research identifies success stories of terrorist acts prevented because of a SAR.

The research concludes with a list of action items agencies should consider when implementing a SAR program. Successful SAR programs rely on the timely analysis of information and sharing intelligence through shared networks.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch
CI/KR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CIAC	Colorado Information Analysis Center
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIAT	Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training
FREA	Financial Records Examination & Analysis
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRTPA	Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
ISA	Israeli Security Authority
ISE	Information Sharing Environment
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LEO	Law Enforcement Online
MCC	Major Cities Chiefs Association
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
MTA	Metropolitan Transportation Authority
NCRIC	Northern California Regional Intelligence Center
N-DEx	Law Enforcement National Data Exchange
NISS	National Information Sharing Strategy
NSI	Nationwide SAR Initiative
NYPD	New York Police Department
OHS	Office of Homeland Security
PMO	Program Management Office
POST	Peace Officers Standards and Training
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report
RMS	Records Management Systems

SAR	Suspicious Activity Reporting
SLTT	State, Local, Tribal, Territorial
TLO	Terrorism Liaison Officer
UCR	Uniform Crime Reports
UK	United Kingdom

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

In the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, homeland security is referred to as a shared responsibility between the government and the citizenry. The document states that to complete a truly national effort, it is essential to encourage and draw upon an informed and active citizenry (p. 4). The report specifically states that citizens should know what to do if they observe suspicious behavior in their community.

In the United States, numerous SARs are implemented at the local, state and federal level. SARs are the mechanisms employed by federal, state, and local level agencies for the public to report suspicious activity related to terrorism or other criminal behavior. Most of the programs are similar in reporting processes, assessment systems and information dissemination to the public. Often, the public accesses a department website and completes documentation of the observed suspicious criminal or terrorist's activity. Those who submit a SAR are normally required to provide identifying information. A staff member from the agency reviews the information and analyzes it according to agency policy.

The United States has approximately 800,000 local, state and federal law enforcement officers and 1.1 million firefighters (VFD Resources, Inc., n.d.). These 1.9 million first responders are tasked with the protection of life and property and respond to millions of calls for service each year. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over 308 million residents live in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Leveraging the entire population of the United States in homeland security efforts can assist in the ability to prevent future terrorist acts in the United States.

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as of September 2007, 12,575 police departments existed in the United States, which do not include

sheriff departments. Approximately 75% of those police agencies serve a population less than 10,000 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.). Smaller departments lack the resources to staff fulltime employees for homeland security functions. Conversely, some large municipal law enforcement agencies have robust homeland security programs that include fusion centers, fulltime staff, and funding. SAR programs are monitored and information processed, verified, and when appropriate, acted upon.

Suspicious criminal and terrorist activity can occur in any town or city in the United States. Germain Difo authored a report in May 2010 that analyzed 32 terrorist plots that have been foiled since 9/11. Citizen vigilance played a role in thwarting an attack in approximately 21% of the cases examined (Difo, 2010). Difo identified two attacks thwarted by direct civilian intervention and five by civilian provided intelligence.

On the other hand, some suspicious incidents have gone unreported, which has resulted in the loss of lives. In preparation for the 9/11 attacks, two of the hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, came to the United States to learn English and take flying lessons. They consulted with a pilot from the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego. The attackers wanted to enroll immediately in jet training. The attackers were focused on learning to control an aircraft in flight and expressed no interest in take offs and landings (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The suspicious activity was not reported.

In another example, Author Loch Johnson in the book *Intelligence and National Security* writes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) failed to respond to warnings from its own agents in Phoenix and Minneapolis about suspicious flight training undertaken by foreigners in those cities (Johnson, 2012, p. 500). Zacarias Moussaoui engaged in flight training in Norman, Oklahoma and Eagan, Minnesota that raised some suspicion. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) eventually arrested him for immigration charges on

August 16, 2001. The FBI did not connect Moussaoui to al Qaeda or a possible threat involving piloted airliners (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 273).

Most law enforcement agencies across the country do not have a SAR system. For example, of the 21 law enforcement agencies in San Mateo County, California, only one agency has a system for citizens to enter suspicious activity on the agency's website, and four agencies advertise an anonymous tip line via a phone number. Thirteen of the agencies have decidedly fewer resources with a population of 35,000 or less. It appears a gap exists in SAR systems implemented by smaller law enforcement agencies. The gap could be a large hole in the country's overall homeland security.

B. BACKGROUND

Municipal law enforcement departments across the United States use a variety of phrases and words to communicate their organizational mission to their staff and communities. Very often, you will find terms such as, community policing, collaboration, community engagement, working closely with the community, the prevention of crime, community partnerships, etc. In essence, law enforcement organizations are expressing to the public the need to work collaboratively together to prevent crime, protect life and property and to create a sense of a safe community. The law enforcement profession recognizes the important role and responsibility that the public plays to achieve its desired outcome. Anonymous tip lines have long served as a mechanism for the public to inform law enforcement agencies of criminal behavior or suspected criminal behavior. Since 9/11, anonymous tip lines have been enhanced to include SRA related to terrorism.

The country's national homeland security strategy documents specifically recognize the public's role in ensuring a safe homeland. Federal, state and local law enforcement have adopted SAR as a strategy to prevent terrorism. However, SAR is less prevalent in smaller organizations than larger police agencies for

many possible reasons including budget restrictions, indifference, knowledge gaps, or other higher priority concerns. Regardless of the obstacle for law enforcement, the country is not taking advantage of its entire human intelligence to prevent acts of terrorism.

The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) was mandated to establish a unified process for reporting, tracking and accessing SARs in a manner that protects civil liberties as directed by the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The NSI strategy included the development of a common method to collect, document, process, analyze, and share SAR intelligence. This effort may be a mechanism for law enforcement agencies across the country to implement a SAR program given the limited resources many agencies encounter.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

Does a gap exist in SAR programs implemented by smaller law enforcement jurisdictions? If so, what are the components of a model SAR program that can be implemented and replicated in smaller law enforcement jurisdictions in the United States? What role can fusion centers or joint terrorism task forces play in the development of SAR programs at smaller law enforcement jurisdictions? To answer the questions, this thesis examines national strategy SAR documents, and specifically, recommendations from the NSI Reporting Initiative. A comparative analysis of current SAR programs implemented in the United States, United Kingdom and Israel is examined. Fusion centers and joint terrorism task forces are analyzed to determine their role in SAR and the resources available to support or initiate SAR programs in smaller law enforcement jurisdictions. Lastly, audits were conducted and analyzed of California police department websites for the existence of SARs, anonymous tip line programs and other terrorism-related information. The audits were categorized in the following population classes consistent with the Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics for the U.S. Department of Justice, FBI (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).

- 10,000 to 24,999
- 25,000 to 49,999
- 50,000 to 99,000
- 100,000 to 249,000
- 250,000 to 499,000
- 500,000 to 999,000
- Over one million

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The research serves as a resource for smaller law enforcement agencies to adopt and implement SAR programs, as well as a document to support the importance of SAR programs in the country's homeland security efforts. Agencies learn the important role the public has in protecting this homeland. The Metropolitan's Transit Authority's "If You See Something, Say Program" might serve as a model community outreach program that can be replicated.

The research highlights the importance of the relationship between the local fusion center and police department. The reader learns about the available resources through fusion center partners and also understands the local law enforcement's responsibility in meeting U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security goals when relating to public awareness and public participation in the area of sharing suspicious information. The research provides law enforcement agencies that cannot staff fulltime personnel to a SAR program a model on how to implement a SAR that can gather, document, process, analyze and share information in a timely manner. Lastly, the research identified a gap in SAR programs hosted by California law enforcement agencies.

E. HYPOTHESIS

This thesis hypothesizes that a gap exists in SAR programs in smaller law enforcement agencies in the United States. As a result, the United States is not meeting the goals of the national homeland security strategies that homeland security is a shared responsibility between the citizenry and the government. The

thesis assumes that local municipal law enforcement is a key component in the nation's homeland security. The thesis also assumes that law enforcement personnel and citizens have the best opportunity to recognize suspicious activity and report the activity to the appropriate authority.

This thesis hypothesizes that existing SAR programs operational in this country and in foreign countries can serve as models for other law enforcement agencies to replicate. International terrorism has a longer history than American terrorism. The United Kingdom and Israel have already experienced the stage of the current U.S. terrorism environment. The lessons learned from the United Kingdom and Israel's community outreach to terrorism are valuable. Both these countries are U.S. allies.

This thesis hypothesizes that the 73 fusion centers throughout the United States as of April 2011 have resources available to local law enforcement to initiate SAR programs and to train personnel in SAR and intelligence analysis functions (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). According to the Department of Homeland Security website, fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners.

By analyzing a sample of SAR programs in municipal law enforcement agencies, international SAR models, and the resource capabilities of fusion centers to local law enforcement, and comparing the analysis to the best practices identified by the NSI and other national strategic documents, the author can research the hypothesis and address the research questions.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

For many decades, law enforcement has engaged the public to help prevent crime and identify offenders. Police and sheriff departments have managed anonymous tip line programs whereby community members can provide information to law enforcement and remain anonymous. Some tip lines are for specific purposes, such as narcotics information. Anonymous persons can report on suspected drug houses, persons selling drugs or other narcotic-related information. The use of anonymous tip lines has resulted in the identification and apprehension of violators, the rescue of victims and the prevention of crime. Since 9/11, anonymous tip lines have continued to be a tactic law enforcement uses to receive crime-related information from the public. However, SAR programs have been implemented to provide a forum for the public to report suspicious activity related to all crimes, as well as suspected terrorism-related activity.

A. NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND SARS

President George W. Bush established the Office of Homeland Security on October 8, 2001, soon after the 9/11 attacks and directed the office's first responsibility to produce the first National Strategy for Homeland Security. President Bush adopted the *2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security* on July 16, 2002. President Bush recognized the document as a beginning or starting point for U.S. national homeland security efforts and that the strategy would be adjusted and amended over time (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, p. vii).

The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security was the first ever homeland security national strategy. The purpose of the strategy was stated within the executive summary. "To mobilize and organize our Nation to secure the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks" (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002). Three strategic objectives were identified in priority with the first

objective to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. Intelligence and warning is one of the six critical mission areas focused on within the overall strategy. Noted in this critical mission area is the need for the intelligence community to identify, collect and analyze new information to help understand emerging threats (p. 15). The strategy synthesizes the concept that intelligence and information analysis is not separate, but rather a key component to prevent and reduce terrorism vulnerability. Actionable intelligence is essential for preventing acts of terrorism (p. 16).

President Bush adopted *The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security* in October 2007, which became the second national strategy document (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007). President Bush clearly states that homeland security is a national effort with shared goals that requires the assistance of all Americans (p. 1). The strategy calls for the creation of an information-sharing environment that extends beyond terror-related intelligence (p. 49). All relevant and appropriate information will be shared throughout all levels of government and the private and non-profit sectors. The FBI has made progress in this area with the adoption of their 2011 National Information Sharing Strategy (NISS) and InfraGard. The goal of the NISS is to coordinate initiatives that emphasize the collection and dissemination of intelligence to meet national security and law enforcement needs (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). The three components of the NISS are the Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx), OneDOJ, and Law Enforcement Online network (LEO) (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). N-DEx provides a nationwide capability for law enforcement to exchange data and police reports and automates patterns or linkages to detect crime and terrorism. OneDOJ allows the FBI to participate with federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement sharing systems. LEO is a web-based communication system for law enforcement to exchange information and participate in online education programs.

InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and private sector dedicated to sharing information to prevent hostile acts against the United States (InfraGard, 2012b). InfraGard chapters are housed at each of the FBI field offices. Memberships include law enforcement, the business community, academic institutions and other state and local agencies (InfraGard, 2012a).

Although these programs appear they are structured to meet their goals of timely information gathering/sharing, data analysis and intelligence dissemination, they rely on people and organizations that must be willing to share information. Federal, state and local law enforcement have proven in the past to be less than cooperative in their information sharing efforts.

In 2004, the President signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004). The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was created from IRTPA. ISE facilitates the exchange of terrorism information among all levels of government, the private sector and foreign partners to disrupt terrorism and enhance homeland security. ISE supports the NSI (ISE—Information Sharing Environment, n.d.). Figure 1 represents the shared spaces network as described in the *SAR Process Implementation Checklist* (p. 17). Figure 2 represents how data is moved to shared spaces and how data is accessed by shared spaces users as described in the *Nationwide SAR Initiative* (p. 7).




Figure 1. Shared Spaces Network




Figure 2. Shared Spaces Process

As seen from Figure 2, the initial entry point for information is local sources. Local municipal law enforcement technology varies across the country.

Advanced technologies include computer aided dispatch (CAD) and records management systems (RMS). These systems coordinate incoming calls for service, service delivery and a computerized RMS. CAD/RMS systems have been operational for about three decades. They are very common in larger city and urban city policing. However, some agencies in rural and urban environments still do not have CAD/RMS systems. They even now rely on card cataloguing and paper filing of police reports. The antiquated systems make it difficult to share and participate in a shared network system. The potential exists that critical intelligence information is housed in these antiquated systems and can never be imported to a shared services network for analysis.

In the past, CAD/RMS systems were independent from one another. Users could only access information within their own data system. To access other jurisdictions' CAD/RMS data, a user would contact the agency and the agency would search for the information. For a more robust search, the party would have to contact multiple agencies and request multiple searches. Shared networks eliminate the redundancy and allow users access to multiple jurisdictions data, which can be accomplished almost instantaneously.

COPLINK is a company that provides technology to law enforcement to establish shared networks or nodes of information sharing (IBM, IBM i2 COPLINK, n.d.). Participants of these nodes can access the records management data of all the participating node agencies. Several of the nodes already exist in California. Participating agencies are not required to have the same CAD/RMS vendor. COPLINK is able to link all the systems and have the data readily assessable to users. COPLINK includes other features, such as link analysis and searching capabilities to assist in investigations. For example, an officer can query a search for subjects with a rose tattoo on their lower arm. All the RMS databases in the node will be queried.

The advantage of the system rests in the fact that all the information and reports completed by a law enforcement agency are entered into the department's CAD/RMS system in which all the work is accomplished. An officer

does not choose which reports or data will be entered into the system. It is all recorded. To be successful, a shared data system would need to work in the same manner. All of a department's RMS data would need to be accessible to the shared network. A network that relies on a data entry decision will not serve the purposes of a shared data network solution.

Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano adopted the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report* (QHSR) in February 2010 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). The primary purpose for the QHSR is to outline a strategic framework for the activities of the homeland security participants (p. vi). Homeland security is characterized as a shared responsibility or enterprise shared by all individuals, families and communities and governmental agencies (p. viii). The protection of the United States and its people, vital interests, and way of life is a key component of the QHSR. Its definition of Homeland Security and will require the abilities of millions of American citizens (p. 15). The enterprise requires a trained and educated America who can identify possible threats, such as a backpack left on a subway. The enterprise requires an America that builds real-time, shared information analysis that does not stovepipe, while not undermining civil liberties (p. 34).

The QHSR refers to itself as a strategic document that outlines a strategic framework and is not a resource prioritization document (p. vi). Goal 1.1, Prevent Terrorist Attacks, has several objectives and one of the objectives is to engage communities (p. 39). Strategies include mechanisms for reporting suspicious activity, and enhance public preparedness and early warning systems. The document does not consider the budget ramifications to governmental agencies to adopt the various strategies. Program implementation requires personnel and operational costs. Municipal government already operates under tight budgetary constraints. The QHSR lacks the funding resource for government, and especially, local government, to accomplish the strategic framework, which is a major shortcoming of many of the strategic documents.

President Obama adopted the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* in June 2011 (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011). The focus of the strategy is the dismantling and defeat of al-Qa'ida (p. 1). The document is written in a more over-arching theme compared to the strategic details identified in the three previous strategies. However, community engagement and information sharing among all levels of law enforcement are identified as key tools to protect this homeland (p. 11).

The National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and Challenges In Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing was published in October 2007. It is the first document by the Bush administration that articulates the national information sharing strategy in a single document (The National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and Challenges In Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, 2007, p. 1). The strategy is designed to improve interagency information sharing at the federal level and create information sharing systems between the federal level and non-federal partners. The strategy reinforces the multi-disciplinary and multi-governmental approach of information sharing and the role of the private sector, foreign partners and allies. A two-way flow of information with the federal government must exist between the state, local and tribal sectors. The strategy identifies the state and major urban area fusion centers and ISE as the key organizations to link the local, state and federal information sharing efforts. The strategy does not specifically address SAR systems at the local level. Also missing from the strategy is an emphasis on the collective American public and its role in information sharing. The focus of the strategy document is a synthesis of all government partners and the private sector. The document claims to be in alignment with previous National Homeland Security Strategy documents.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) developed the *Suspicious Activity Reporting, Process Implementation Checklist* in 2008 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008). The document provides a blueprint on how local law enforcement

agencies can implement a SAR program. The document recognizes that law enforcement agencies have been gathering and sharing information for years on criminal behavior and activity to detect, prevent and solve crimes. SAR can be implemented within agencies' current frameworks to gather, document, process, analyze and share information indicative of criminal behavior and/or terrorism. The checklist includes the Chief Executive's role, SAR process development, incorporation of national guidelines into standard operating procedures, implementation of privacy policy, training of agency personnel, institutionalization of the agency, and the education of the public and partnering with other networks. For example, the ISE Shared Spaces Solution allows law enforcement agencies to share information with other agencies without directly accessing each other's databases (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 16). The Shared Spaces Solution may be the link to allow the two-way communication between a local SAR effort and its state and federal partners.

The Information Sharing Environment provides analysts, operators and investigators the ability to enhance U.S. national security. According to ISE's 2010 annual report to Congress, the NSI is the nation's neighborhood watch. ISE describes the NSI as its most significant accomplishment since the deficiencies highlighted by the 9/11 Commission (Information Sharing Environment Annual Report to Congress, 2010).

As mentioned earlier, 75% of law enforcement agencies in the United States serve populations less than 10,000. The document does not speak to the large number of police departments that do not have access to computers and cannot participate in a shared spaces solution. Strategies need to be developed to allow all law enforcement agencies the ability to participate in the information-sharing environment.

The NSI was mandated to establish a unified process for reporting, tracking and accessing SARs in a manner that protects civil liberties as directed by the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The NSI strategy included the

development of a common method to collect, document, process, analyze and share SAR intelligence (Figure 3). The cycle represents the path of information from the observation by the initial officer, supervisor review, information forwarded to Joint Terrorism Task Force/Fusion Center (JTTF) and the continuing analysis, processing and dissemination. The Program Management Office (PMO) is responsible for the nationwide implementation of a SAR process by coordinating existing resources and managing additional support (Nationwide SAR Initiative, n.d.b.). The PMO was established in March 2010. The established process allows information to be received at the local level. The local level can vet the information and forward it to the local JTTF. The information is further analyzed and entered into the Shared Spaces Solution database. Government agencies can access the shared database as needed. The NSI ensures that terrorism-related SARS are available to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and state and major urban area fusion centers. The JTTF or fusion center will determine the actions required as a result of the analysis.

Nationwide SAR Cycle




Figure 3. SAR Cycle (From: Nationwide SAR Initiative, n.d.b., p .4)

One of the shortcomings of the SAR cycle is that information does not get pushed back to the local authorities. Locals input into the process, but must access the shared spaces database to retrieve information, which requires a conscious act by locals. Analysis and intelligence should be pushed out to the locals that would ensure that the intelligence went back to the agency. It would still be desirable for locals to engage the database for SAR and other related information actively.

Training of frontline law enforcement in the indicators of suspicious terrorist-related activity is another key element in the SAR cycle. This component can be challenging to local law enforcement. Smaller agencies already have limited personnel resources. In California, the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) regulates police training and certification. POST requires 24 hours of continuing professional training every two years for police officers. POST has other perishable skills training mandates (first aid, emergency operation of vehicles, arrest control tactics, and firearms) which add to the training requirements. Additional training will add more of a burden on local law enforcement. Creative solutions should be considered that include train the trainer programs, distance learning, DVD roll-call training, state or federal reimbursement programs for training, backfill funding for officers sent to training, and localized training through JTTFs.

The document *Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report, Support and Implementation Project* was published in June 2008. The DOJ, BJA, Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security sponsored and developed the report. The Office of the Program Manager of ISE assisted in the project. The Los Angeles Police Department and Police Chief William Bratton contributed to the document along with executives from other major U.S. municipal police departments.

The Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC) is comprised of the 63 largest police and sheriff agencies in the United States. It serves 68 million people in the

United States and represents a workforce of 159,000 sworn and non-sworn personnel (Major Cities Chiefs Police Association, 2012). The MCC was formed to provide a forum for large urban area law enforcement agencies to discuss its challenges.

The purpose of the Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support and Implementation Project is to describe the all-crimes approach to gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity by the local police agency (Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report, Support and Implementation Project, 2008). The report and its recommendations establish guidelines for the timely sharing of SAR information (p. 1). Over 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States document suspicious activity and some terrorist related, and therefore, national standardization is necessary (p. 6).

The project focused its recommendations in the following key areas.

- Executive leadership
- Privacy and civil liberties protection
- Gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity
- Standard reporting format and data collection codes
- Training and community outreach
- Technology

In all the key areas, major findings were identified and recommended for agencies that have implemented SAR programs or for those agencies that intend to adopt a program. The overarching theme is the implementation of a SAR program that has the ability to analyze information, take appropriate action and share the information with its local, state and federal partners in a timely manner. Further analysis was obtained through site visits to the Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston and Miami-Dade police departments.

A shortcoming of the entire document and its findings is that law enforcement was represented by the MCC, which represents less than 25% of the population of the United States and about 20% of the law enforcement

personnel. The challenges confronting MCC and the rest of law enforcement are different. Agencies that are not members of MCC operate with much smaller budgets and personnel. MCC does not represent all of law enforcement. Development of these types of initiatives should always include representatives of smaller agencies more indicative of policing in the United States.

The overall recommendations in the key areas are valid, but may be unattainable for the typical law enforcement agency in the United States. For example, the technology chapter recommends agencies use virtual fusion centers, computer aided dispatch technology, computer records management systems, electronic reporting systems for field incidents, and mapping tools. These technology recommendations may be cost prohibitive at smaller law enforcement jurisdictions. SAR relies on the timely gathering and analyzing of information and agencies without the technology enhancements might not be able to meet national SAR standards. Perspective from a wider demographic sample of police agencies would have benefited the process.

The document *Suspicious Activity Reporting, Process Implementation Checklist* is a companion document to the *Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project* document dated June 2008. The checklist document identifies key components and action items necessary to implement a comprehensive SAR process that will aid agencies in crime prevention efforts and incorporate agencies into the nationwide SAR process (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 3). A SAR is defined as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal behavior” (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2008, p. 2). The SAR implementation checklist identified the following eight strategic areas.

1. Leadership must recognize the importance of implementing a SAR process
2. Identify existing SAR processes and determine what SAR processes need to be developed
3. Incorporate national guidelines into standard operating procedures

4. Implement an agency privacy policy
5. Train all agency personnel on the SAR process
6. Institutionalize the SAR process within the agency
7. Educate the community on the SAR process
8. Partner with others and connect to information sharing networks

In addition to the eight categories, 41 sub-action items are designed to assist agencies in reaching the desired outcome of the eight strategic areas. The action items are a “how to” for agencies to consider when implementing a SAR process.

The process implementation checklist document is a 20-page brief overview highlighting the key areas and action items to implement a SAR. It is a companion document to the more detailed 49 page *Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project* document. However, the national standards for SAR are clearly identified and supported by action items. The document is a good resource to gain an initial understanding of SAR and the components of a model SAR program.

The eight strategic checklist areas clearly address the key components of leadership, national standards, privacy policy, training of personnel, education of the community, and the use of information sharing networks. These core initiatives should be considered prior to adopting a SAR program.

B. FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL SAR INITIATIVES

A list follows of some of the various SAR programs in use by agencies and how the public can gain access.

- Department of Homeland Security (DHS): The DHS website links users to the “FBI Tips and Public Leads.” The purpose is to report suspected criminal or terrorist activity. The link is navigated through the *Counterterrorism* tab on the homepage (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.a.). In July 2010, the DHS launched a national public awareness campaign of the “If you see something, say something” program developed by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The campaign includes marketing on television with the goal to raise public awareness of the indicators

of terrorism and criminal activity. The campaign respects civil rights or civil liberties by emphasizing behavior, rather than appearance, in identifying suspicious activity. Observers are encouraged to report suspicious activity to their local law enforcement or dial 911.

- Federal Bureau of Investigation: “FBI Tips and Public Leads” is navigated through the FBI homepage at the *Contact Us* tab and drop down *Submit a Tip on Crime/Terrorism*. The submittal page states an FBI agent or professional staff member will review the information promptly. Local office websites do not have direct web reporting of suspicious activity. The local office provides a phone number to report criminal activity or a user can navigate to the main FBI website and report activity as described earlier (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).
- New York Police Department (NYPD): From the menu on the homepage, a user can navigate to the *Submit Internet Tip* webpage. The *Counterterrorism* link does not have a function for the public to report suspicious activity (New York Police Department, n.d.).
- New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA): The MTA adopted the “If You See Something, Say Something” public awareness program. The MTA encourages passengers to phone police if they see something suspicious. The MTA provides the following information to their passengers on its website (Metropolitan Transportation Authority, n.d.).
 - Be alert to unattended packages
 - Be wary of suspicious behavior
 - Take notice of people in bulky or inappropriate clothing
 - Report exposed wiring or other irregularities
 - Report anyone tampering with surveillance cameras or entering unauthorized areas
- Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD): LAPD’s iWatch program is accessed at the department’s homepage by a 1-inch picture of the program’s logo. IWatch is a community awareness program created to educate the public about behaviors and activities that may have a connection to terrorism or other criminal activity. Web users are directed to a tool to report the suspicious behavior (Los Angeles Police Department, n.d.).
- Anaheim California Police Department SAR: SAR is accessed via the homepage. Users are directed to the SAR page from the *Crime & Prevention* link. The SAR page includes additional links and information, which include a definition of SAR, pre-attack indicators,

criminal activity tips, and important links. The website allows users to submit suspected criminal behavior. Users are required to provide personal information for contact. If personal information is not provided, the submitter cannot proceed to subsequent entry pages. The Important Links page directs user to a variety of government training bulletins identifying potential indicators of terrorist activities (Anaheim Police Department, n.d.).

C. INTERNATIONAL MODELS

1. SAR in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) has been engaged in the war on terrorism much longer than the United States. The Irish Republic Army and Muslim extremists have conducted violent terrorist attacks in England and Ireland for many years. The United Kingdom is a likely country to examine counterterrorist strategies, and specifically, the use of public awareness campaigns directed at suspicious activity reporting.

a. The UK's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (March 2009)

The aim of the UK's 2009 strategy was to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence (The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, 2009, p. 8). The UK's strategies are based on four key frameworks: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare (p. 13). The pursue (stop terrorist attacks), prevent (stop people from becoming terrorists) and protect (strengthen protection against terrorist attack) strategies have a direct link to community awareness and reporting campaigns. These strategies recognize the importance of community involvement and communication in pursuing, preventing and protecting the United Kingdom from terrorism. All communities are needed to stand up and reject violent extremism (p. 55).

The Metropolitan Police Service's (MPS) anti-terrorist public awareness campaigns and SAR are linked to the broader UK's strategy for

countering international terrorism. The MPS's strategies provide a link to the community to share observable information with law enforcement in an attempt to pursue terrorists, prevent terrorism, and protect the United Kingdom from terrorist attacks.

b. Metropolitan Police Service

The MPS serves the greater London area. The MPS employs over 52,000 personnel of which 33,000 are officers. The MPS headquarters is located in the New Scotland Yard and has over 140 police stations. The MPS polices an area over 600 square miles.

From the MPS website homepage, the user can select "*Counter Terrorism*" and access information to report suspicious activity via the confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline (Metropolitan Police Services, n.d.). The hotline is staffed at all times by counter-terrorism police officers and professional staff. Users are also directed to a link to report online activity believed to be terrorist related at Directgov, which encourages online users to report the following activity (Directgov, Crime and Justice, n.d.).

- Speeches or essays calling for racial or religious violence
- Videos of violence with messages of praise for the attackers
- Chat forums with postings calling for people to commit acts of terrorism
- Messages intended to stir up hatred against any religious or ethnic group
- Instructions on how to make weapons, poisons or bombs

The MPS combines SAR with a public awareness campaign that includes the distribution of posters, window stickers, radio messaging and stories in the local newspapers. The goal is to educate and train all citizens of indicators of suspicious activity and the process for reporting information.

2. SAR in Israel

In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Science and Technology published the report “Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S.” The study examined the Israeli approach to public engagement in counterterrorism efforts and identified successfully used practices by Israel to leverage the public to deter and defeat terrorist attacks (p. 1). The two key findings of the study are the following.

1. The Israeli public plays a significant role in the counterterrorism efforts
2. The government has adopted a fourfold strategy of effective public participation, which includes a well-educated public in the reporting of suspicious activity (p. 2).

Dr. Ariel Merari, head of the Center for Political Violence at Tel Aviv University and a leading researcher on suicide bombings in Israel, points to public participation as being “one of the cornerstones of Israeli defensive measures against terrorism in the domestic arena” (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 48).

Merari added, “Much of Israel’s success in thwarting terrorist bombings can be attributed to public awareness. The majority of explosive devices planted in public sites such as bus stations, supermarkets, and shopping centers have been discovered by civilians who were able to alert the police before the bombs went off. Public alertness has been encouraged by police advertisements on television and other media, but the main reason for this high-level alertness has undoubtedly been the Israeli public’s identification with the struggle against terrorism” (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 48).

The Israeli Police, through its Community and Civil Guard Department, started a campaign in 2002 entitled “Terror—Let’s Stop it Together.” Pamphlets were issued to the public that provided guidance on the following: suspicious

signs that can give away a suicide bomber, including external appearance, suspicious behavior, and suspicious equipment; how to identify a suspicious vehicle; what to do in the event you suspect something (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 50).

The Israeli Home Front Command hosts a website that provides the Israeli people information on emergency preparedness, emergency response, search and rescue and training. The site serves as its community outreach platform. The site educates the public on suspicious objects, vehicles, and individuals. The National Police are the point of contact for SAR and all tips are received at the “Dial 100” telephone number (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 53). The same number serves the entire country. Not all public outreach programs proved successful. The Israeli Security Authority (ISA) sponsored a “tips hotline,” through which the public could relay information. However, the hotline was terminated because the large volume of calls resulted in wasted efforts by the agency following up information that ultimately did not prove beneficial (Public Role and Engagement in Counterterrorism Efforts: Implications of Israeli Practices for the U.S., 2009, p. 53). The National Police assess all information received through the “Dial 100” program and forward terrorist-related information to the ISA.

3. Legal and Privacy Issues

SAR has not been without its detractors who are concerned about the privacy and records retention aspects of SAR programs. In July 2008, Mike German and Jay Stanley authored an article entitled “Fusion Center Update” for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). According to German and Stanley, SAR policing opens the door to racial profiling and other improper police behavior, and exposes law-abiding people to government prying into their private affairs without just cause (German & Stanley, 2008, p. 2).

The collection of “non-criminal” information is counter to Title 28, Part 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which states that law enforcement agencies: “shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual only if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity.” German and Stanley site several examples of people detained by law enforcement in the United States for perceived suspicious behavior and when it was later determined that no illegal activity occurred.

On July 29, 2010, the ACLU published an article in their newsletter entitled “More About Suspicious Activity Reporting.” The article contends that SAR programs increase the probability that police will stop innocent people and have their personal information included in law enforcement databases. SAR opens the door to racial profiling and other improper police practices. The ACLU argues that oversight is needed to ensure the reasonable suspicion threshold is met in SAR programs and intelligence gathering.

The DHS and the DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services sponsored the 56-page *Fusion Center Privacy Development* document dated April 2010 (DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services, 2010). Although the document is written specifically for fusion centers), the same privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties concerns associated with fusion centers are also applicable to SAR programs. More importantly, SAR programs are a component of fusion centers across the country. The document recognizes that intelligence fusion centers are an efficient and effective mechanism to exchange information and fight crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of resources (p. 1). Privacy and civil liberties protection policies must be in place. The purpose of a privacy policy is to ensure the center will abide by legal requirements that protect constitutional rights as fusion centers gather and share information.

The document includes a comprehensive policy development template (DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services, 2010,

pp. 5–37). The template is presented in a workbook model, which guide policy developers through a series of questions and sample language. The document includes all the pertinent areas of concern for policy developers to consider when crafting a policy for their fusion center or local law enforcement SAR system.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A website audit was the primary methodology to address the question if a gap exists in the SAR systems implemented by smaller law enforcement agencies in the United States. An audit was conducted of the California police departments that contribute to the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for the DOJ whose populations range from 10,000 to over one million (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). Websites were audited for the existence of SAR programs, tip line programs, and links to federal, state or fusion centers SAR programs. The websites were also audited for terrorism prevention and crime prevention information. In all, 355 California police department websites were audited. The audits were categorized by the following city populations serviced by the police agency (see Appendix A).

- 10,000 to 24,999: 103 agencies
- 25,000 to 49,999: 90 agencies
- 50,000 to 99,000: 99 agencies
- 100,000 to 249,000: 50 agencies
- 250,000 to 499,000: 9 agencies
- 500,000 to 999,000: 2 agencies
- Over one million: 2 agencies

The categories are consistent with the DOJ UCR of crime statistics population categories. The population of each city was determined through census data and recorded. Census data was analyzed to determine the percentage of population between specific categories, as well as to the total population serviced by the 355 UCR agencies.

The research identified model SAR programs implemented in the United States, New York Police Department, New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, LAPD and the Anaheim Police Department (Anaheim, CA). The term model was defined as a SAR program that aligned with the recommendations of the *Suspicious Activity Reporting, Process Implementation Checklist* document

or other appropriate national or international standards and legal tests. Further analysis of the model agencies explored examples of SAR that resulted in the disruption or identification of a homeland security issue. Special attention was given to programs that could be replicated using limited resources.

An audit of a sampling of the training offered by fusion centers was conducted. Included in the audit were the topic of training, method of delivery, frequency of the training and the availability. The analysis included the geographic locations of the fusion centers, which aided in determining the span of control of the fusion center and the possible disconnect from law enforcement agencies.

Policy analysis was the method used to examine the privacy issues related to SAR reporting. The *Fusion Center Privacy Policy Development* document served as a resource. Other government documents, litigation/case law, as well as research conducted by the ACLU was examined. These policies form the basis to analyze and compare model SAR programs and their adherence to privacy policy best practices.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. POPULATION GROUPS AND CATEGORIES ANALYSIS

According to the California Police Chiefs Association, 334 municipal police agencies represent about 70% of the California population. The remainder of the population is serviced by a sheriff's office either directly or through contract services. Agencies selected for this research analysis included all the California police agencies that contribute crime data annually to the DOJ UCR. The DOJ records crime data for all cities in the United States from law enforcement agencies serving populations from 10,000 to over million. The cities are distributed in seven population categories. The agencies reflected are predominately municipal police departments, but also include cities that contract sheriff services. In 2010, 355 California police departments contributed crime data to the DOJ UCR (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).

Each of the 355 websites was accessed and searched for SAR programs, tip line programs, links to other state, federal or fusion center SAR programs, terrorism prevention information and crime prevention information. The audits were conducted using the same population categories as reported by the DOJ UCR. The presence of these programs indicates the level of participation by California police departments of SAR programs.

The population serviced by the 355 agencies that contributed data to the UCR was 29,270,474. The population of the state of California is 37,691,912. The 355 agencies represent 77.6% of the population of California and 9.3% of the population of the United States, 311,591,917 (see Table 1). The 355 agencies represent a large sample of the overall California population. Although the sample size, 9.3%, is much smaller compared to the U.S. population, it is still a large enough sample that could be extrapolated to represent a larger U.S. trend.

Geographic Area	Population	Percentage of U.S.
United States	311,591,917 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).	
California	37,691,912 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).	12.1%
Cities Audited	29,270,474	9.3%

Table 1. United States and California Population

The largest numbers of agencies are represented in the 10,000 to 24,999 category with 103 agencies, or 29% of the total agencies. However, the population served by this category is 1.7 million or 5.8% of the represented population. The 100,000 to 249,999 category represents the largest percentile of the population at 24.8%, and 14% of the total UCR agencies. The categories from 10,000 to 249,999 population represent 342 agencies or 96.3% of the total agencies and 64.7% of the total population. Combined, the category 50,000 to 99,999 and 100,000 to 249,000 represent 41.9% of the agencies and 47.8% of the total population (see Table 2). The cities of Los Angeles and San Diego represent the two cities in the over one million category. They account for over five million population or 17.4% of the total represented population.

Population Served by Agency	Number of Agencies	CA Population Served	Percent of Total Population
10,000 to 24,999	103	1,725,525	5.8%
25,000 to 49,999	90	3,217,454	10.9%
50,000 to 99,999	99	6,749,065	23.0%
100,000 to 249,999	50	7,270,139	24.8%
250,000 to 499,999	9	3,462,886	11.8%
500,000 to 999,999	2	1,751,177	5.9%
Over One Million	2	5,094,228	17.4%
Totals	355	29,270,474	100.00%

Table 2. Total Agencies and Populations Served

1. Overall Results

Overall results of the website audits are tabulated in Table 3. Of the 355 police department websites, 21 included a SAR program. SAR programs are only present in 5.9% of the total number of agencies. Terrorism prevention information

is less represented at 3.9% or 14 of the police department websites. Links to federal, state or fusion center SAR websites were found on 67 of the websites or 18.8 percent. The more traditional law enforcement anonymous tip line and crime prevention programs were more prevalent. Tip lines were present in 40.5% of the websites and crime prevention information in 58 percent.

Overall SAR program participation, 5.9% of police departments, is significantly underrepresented and does not meet the directives of U.S. national strategy documents as discussed earlier. The public does not have a local forum to report suspicious activity. California police departments lack a system to receive terrorism-related information from the public and analyze it for intelligence distribution and action. Although tip lines are more common, they are present in less than half of California police departments.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of 355 Total Police Departments
SAR	21	5.9%
Tip line	144	40.5%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	67	18.8%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	14	3.9%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	203	58.0%

Table 3. Overall Results

In the population category of 10,000 to 24,999, all five audited categories fall below the overall findings (see Table 4). SAR programs were present in 3.8% of the websites compared to the overall findings of 5.9 percent. In all, only four of the 103 agencies in this category displayed a SAR program on their website. Tip line programs were found in 32 of the 103 agencies or 31% compared to 40.5% of all agencies combined. An even steeper decline in the crime prevention category existed at 34.9% compared to the overall rate of 58 percent.

The data suggest that smaller agencies are less likely to incorporate these types of services or programs in their departments. The reason may be the lack of resources available to departments, such as personnel, technology or funding.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	4	3.8%
Tip line	32	31.0%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	18	17.4%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	4	3.8%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	36	34.9%

Table 4. 10,000–24,999: 103 Total Agencies, Population Served: 1,725,525

In the population category 25,000 to 49,999, four of the five audited categories fell below the overall results, but the figures were closely consistent with the overall results (see Table 5). SAR programs were present in four of the 99 agencies or 4.4% compared to 5.9% in overall results. The link to federal, state, and fusion center SAR programs was present in 22.2% of the websites compared to 18.8% in the overall results. As with the 10,000 to 24,999 category, the 25,000 to 49,000 category significantly lacked the presence of SAR programs and terrorism prevention information.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	4	4.4%
Tip line	34	37.7%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	20	22.2%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	2	2.2%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	50	55.5%

Table 5. 825,000–49,999: 90 Total Agencies, Population Served: 3,217,454

The population category 50,000 to 99,999 represented the second highest population group at 23% or 6,749,055 with 99 police agencies reporting. The group exceeded the overall results in four of the five categories (see Table 6). The most significant difference was the crime prevention category, which was represented in 71.7% of the police departments compared to 58% in the overall results. The tip line category increased from 40.5% to 51.5% and the link category from 18.8% to 25.2 percent.

A SAR program was found on 6% of the police department websites in the category. Again, SAR programs are significantly underrepresented programs on police department websites.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	6	6.0%
Tip line	51	51.5%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	25	25.2%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	3	3.0%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	71	71.7%

Table 6. 950,000–99,999: 99 Total Agencies, Population Served: 6,749,065

The population category 100,000 to 249,999 represented the highest population group at 24.8% or 7,270,139 with 50 police agencies reporting. The category fell below the overall results in four of the five categories (see Table 7). Crime prevention information was present in 78% of the websites compared to 58% in the overall results. Only one agency displayed a SAR program on its website and one agency displayed a link to federal or state resources.

The results are in contrast to the 50,000 to 99,999 group that exceeded overall results in four of the five categories. With larger agencies, greater resources and the ability for agencies to adopt terrorism prevention type programs would be expected. However, the presence of such programs was less present in this category than the overall results and the 50,000 to 99,999 group.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	1	2.0%
Tip line	19	38.0%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	1	2.0%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	1	2.0%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	39	78.0%

Table 7. 100,000–249,999: 50 Total Agencies, Population Served: 7,270,139

The 250,000 to 499,999 category represented 11.8% of the total population with nine agencies reporting to the UCR. The Fresno Police Department's UCR data was reported by the DOJ in this category even though their population is 510,365. The group exceeded the overall results in four of the five categories. SAR programs were present on 55.5% of the department websites compared to the overall result of 5.9 percent. Terrorism prevention information was present on 33.3% of the websites compared to 3.9% of the overall results. Tip line programs exceeded the overall results by 15% and the link to federal, state and fusion center SAR increased by 3.4 percent. Crime prevention information was present on 33.3% of the websites compared to 58% of the overall results (see Table 8).

Although the presence of the categories and programs increased in four areas, and in some cases significantly, the fact that the population group is represented by only nine police agencies needs to be considered. However, the result may be an indicator that agencies in this population group are better positioned to staff and maintain these types of terrorism preventative programs.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	5	55.5%
Tip line	5	55.5%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	2	22.2%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	3	33.3%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	3	33.3%

Table 8. 11250,000–499,999: 9 Total Agencies, Population: Served 3,462,886

The population group 500,000 to 999,999 was represented by two agencies with a total population of 1,751,177 or 5.9% of the overall reporting population. Both agencies hosted a tip line and crime prevention information on their websites, but none of the three remaining categories were present (see Table 9).

The category population is about the same as the 10,000 to 24,999 category at 5.8 percent. However, 103 police departments represent the latter category. A trend does not seem to be established that as departments increase in size, they are more likely to include terrorism preventative programs for the public to access.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	0	0%
Tipline	2	100%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	0	0%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	0	0%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	2	100%

Table 9. 500,000–999,999: 2 Total Agencies, Population Served: 1,751,177

The one million plus category included two police agencies and represented 17.4% of the population or 5,094,228 (see Table 10). One of the agencies included all the programs on their website and the second agency included crime prevention information only.

Criteria	Number of Agencies	Percentage of Agencies
SAR	1	50%
Tip line	1	50%
Link to Federal, State, Fusion Center SAR	1	50%
Terrorism Prevention Information Viewable	1	50%
Crime Prevention Information Viewable	2	100%

Table 10. One Million +: 2 Total Agencies, Population Served: 5,094,228

2. Summary

Figure 14 summarizes the population groups and categories. The bottom number in the group column represents the number of police agencies in each grouping. The top number in the population column represents the group percentage compared to the total population of the 355 agencies that contributed to the UCR. The bottom number is the actual population. The remaining numbers

and percentages reflect the number of department websites that included a SAR program, tip line program, link to other state, federal or fusion center SARs, terror prevention information or crime prevention information and the associated percentage.

Overall, SAR programs are only found on 21 websites for 5.9% of the 355 audited police department websites. With the exception of the 250,000 to 499,000 and one million plus categories, SAR programs are nearly non-existent (15 of 344 websites/4.3%). The 250,000 and one million plus category account for six SAR programs at 11 websites, 54.5 percent. The three largest population groups (250,000 to one million plus) reflect 35.1% of the population with 13 total police departments. An effort by these 13 departments to adopt SAR website programs would impact the public's ability to report suspicious activity.

The two most populated groups are 50,000 to 99,999 and 100,000 to 249,999. The groups account for 47.8% of the population and 149 police agencies. Of the 149 agencies, only seven have a SAR program on their website. Of those same 149 agencies, 26 had a link to a federal, state or fusion center SAR. It may be more practical for these agencies to provide the public with links to SAR programs rather than support their own SAR program.

The 10,000 to 24,999 and 500,000 to 999,999 categories represent nearly the same population at 5.8% and 5.9%, respectively. However, the former group reflects 103 police agencies and the latter only two. The two departments in the 500,000 to 999,999 group might more easily adopt their own programs while the smaller agency group may be better served by linking to other resources.

The presence of terrorism-related prevention and education information follows the same trend as the SAR programs. Only 14 websites provided any information to the public (3.9% of 355 websites). Combined, SAR (5.9%) and links (18.8%) provide the public with greater opportunity to report suspicious

terrorism-related information through a website. With the addition of tip line programs (144 agencies/40.5%), the public has even a greater opportunity to report suspicious behavior.

Group	POP %	SAR	Tip	Link	Terror	Crime
10–24K	5.8%	4	32	18	4	36
103	1,725,525	3.8%	31%	17.4%	3.8%	34.9%
25–49K	10.9%	4	34	20	2	50
90	3,217,454	4.4%	37.7%	22.2%	2.2%	55.5%
50–99K	23.0%	6	51	25	3	71
99	6,749,065	6.0%	51.5%	25.2%	3.0%	71.7%
100–249K	24.8%	1	19	1	1	39
50	7,720,139	2%	38%	2%	2%	78%
250–499K	11.8%	5	5	2	3	3
9	3,462,886	55.5%	55.5%	22.2%	33.3%	33.3%
500–999K	5.9%	0	2	0	0	2
2	1,751,177	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%
1 Mil +	17.4%	1	1	1	1	2
2	5,094,228	50%	50%	50%	50%	100%
Total	29,270,474	21	144	67	14	203
	100%	5.9%	40.5%	18.8%	3.9%	58%

Table 11. Summary of the Population Groups and Categories

A secondary audit was conducted to verify the results of the website audit methodology. In the absence of a department sponsored website SAR program, agencies may have other mechanisms whereby members of the public can report suspicious activity related to terrorism directly to the agency. Of the 355 California police agencies, 117 were contacted and inquired about SAR programming. To ensure a level of randomness, every third agency by alphabetical order was selected.

Phone contact was made with each department. Departments were asked if they had a specific phone line to accept suspicious activity related to terrorism and if they had any other means for the public to report SAR directly to the agency. Of the 117 agencies, three or 2.6%, responded they had a phone line or other mechanism for the public to report suspicious activity directly to them (see Appendix B).

The results are consistent with the website audit. A very small percentage of California police agencies, 5.9%, support a SAR program on their website and 2.6% support a mechanism that the public can report suspicious terrorist activity directly to the agency.

The audits did not explore the department's ability to report suspicious activity to the appropriate authority, JTTF or fusion center. The research is focused on the ability for members of the public to report suspicious activity directly to their agency of jurisdiction through a SAR supported program.

B. FUSION CENTER RESOURCES ANALYSIS

The DHS website states that fusion centers receive information from a variety of sources, including SAR from stakeholders within their jurisdictions, as well as federal information and intelligence. They analyze the information and develop relevant products to disseminate to their customers. These products assist homeland security partners at all levels of government to identify and address immediate and emerging threats (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b.; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c.); Criminal Intelligence Training Master Calendar, n.d.).

There are 73 fusion centers across the country and at least one fusion center in each state (see Appendix C for a complete list of fusion centers) (National Fusion Center Association, n.d.).

Fusion centers facilitate a wide variety of training for the law enforcement community. The training is conducted at locations within the geographic boundaries of the individual fusion centers. Local law enforcement agencies can host the training to bring the training sites closer to the first responders. In 2011, the DHS offered 66 classes across the United States in the intelligence analysis field of study. The courses were available to local law enforcement practitioners. For a complete list of training for 2011, refer to Appendix D.

Other local fusion centers offer additional specialized training to enhance homeland security preparedness and first responder skills. The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) offers courses throughout the year in a variety of topics including intelligence analysis, basic and intermediate Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO), improvised explosive devices, Muslim extremism, surveillance detection for critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), civil liberties and many others. The classes do not require tuition and are held at venues within driving distances for regional participants (see Appendix E for July–August 2012 calendar).

In 2005, the New York State Office of Homeland Security (OHS) announced the plans to develop a State Preparedness Training Center. The training center is now located at the Oneida Airport in New York. The mission of OHS as stated in the Office of Counter Terrorism New York State Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Services website is, “The mission of OHS in this charge is to coordinate WMD/Terrorism training throughout New York State and to ensure that all training “deliverables” are evaluated for content, suitability, and duplication so as to ensure the highest level of preparedness for New York’s first responders” (New York State, n.d.a.). OHS serves as the point source for homeland security preparedness training in the City of New York (see Appendix F for the training calendar).

C. NSI TRAINING ANALYSIS

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and NSI developed a standardized training program for law enforcement officers on how to recognize behaviors associated with pre-incident terrorism activities and how to document suspicious activities. The training includes information on how to protect the privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of individuals. The training consists of a 15-minute video, *NSI SAR Line Officer Training CD*. The video can be viewed in-person or via a web link. After viewing the video, officers complete a form on the NSI website indicating completion of the training. A web-based

training video or CD is a good alternative for agencies that cannot send personnel to a training venue. The video can be shown to groups of officers during roll call, and therefore, minimizes the impact on organizations and staffing.

This type of training delivery model fits well with smaller jurisdictions that lack the resources to send personnel to training. Also, smaller jurisdictions often lack the expertise in specialized fields, such as homeland security. Bringing a virtual homeland security expert into a department to train personnel and to accomplish the training at no cost is a good solution for the smaller law enforcement departments.

Although larger law enforcement departments often staff many different specialized units, the suspicious activity training CD is also advantageous. Large groups of officers can receive the training in a short period of time. Again, a roll-call environment would be a good venue to conduct the training.

1. Analysis of SAR Intervention Success Stories

The implementation and management of a SAR program requires departmental resources that include personnel and operational expenditures. With limited resources, the question remains if SAR programs result in actionable intelligence that justify the funding and personnel commitment by agencies. As stated earlier, a SAR program includes all criminal activity and is not confined to terrorism-related incidents. Police agencies have managed anonymous tip line programs for decades and these tip lines have resulted in the apprehension of criminals. SAR is an enhancement of the tip line format to include terrorism and homeland security. Two examples of SARs that aided in the criminal investigation or arrest of suspects are listed below. The examples were highlighted on the DHS website (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011; Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), n.d.a.; Johnson & Wirtz, 2008).

a. *Fusion Centers Provide Critical Information to Faisal Shahzad Case*

On May 1, 2010, Pakistani born Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, New York. He was eventually arrested on May 3 at the JFK International Airport as he attempted to fly to Dubai. Following the attempted bombing, the U.S. intelligence community began sharing tips and leads.

During the investigation to find Shahzad, an AAA employee filed a suspicious activity report on May 2 with the New York State Intelligence Center. Shahzad called for AAA assistance because he locked his keys in his car. Police seized the car at the airport at the time of Shahzad's arrest. A firearm was recovered in the car. The information aided the FBI in its investigation.

The circumstances highlight the value of SAR programs. An alert citizen was able to access a SAR system and provide information critical to a terrorist bombing attempt. The intelligence center was able to retrieve the information and create intelligence that aided in the investigation. This example points to the principle that an informed citizenry is an important component in U.S. homeland security efforts.

b. *Fusion Center Supports Zazi Investigation—Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC), September 2009*

In September 2009, Afghan born Najibullah Zazi planned a suicide bombing at the New York City subway. After becoming suspicious that he was being investigated in New York, Zazi flew back to Denver, Colorado. He was arrested on September 19.

During the investigation, the CIAC received suspicious activity reports through its website and 1-800 number. The information was shared with the DHS and the Denver FBI. The information aided in the investigation, which is a specific example of a report filed at a SAR website and a phone number. Two separate forms of submitting information were accessible to the public. Without a

specific mechanism for the public to report, important pieces of information may never be known and could jeopardize the safety of Americans. The two significant terrorist bombing plots could have had different outcomes had there not been SAR programs for the public to submit information.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

SARs are extensions of the anonymous tip line programs that have been sponsored by police agencies for decades. SARs have developed over recent years in response to the post 9/11 homeland security strategy documents. The goal is to have an informed citizenry that can recognize suspicious activity related to terrorism and other crimes and report the information to stop terrorist activity. It is understood that terrorist activity can occur in any city in the United States, and it will take an educated and watchful citizenry to prevent acts.

The 73 fusion centers in the United States have become the clearinghouse for much of the SAR activity. In addition, governmental agencies, such as DHS, FBI, NYPD, LAPD and many others, have adopted their own SAR programs into their operations. The larger federal agencies are tasked with terrorism prevention responsibilities, and therefore, staff SAR programs. Los Angeles and New York City are terrorist targets and have dedicated homeland security divisions including SAR programs.

The research began with the fact that of the 21 law enforcement agencies in San Mateo County, California, one or 4.7% of the agencies support a SAR program. Thirteen of the 21 agencies support a population less than 35,000 and one agency supports a community of 101,000. The problem statement began with the statement that a gap appears to exist in SAR systems implemented by smaller law enforcement agencies and the gap can be a larger hole in the country's overall homeland security.

A website audit of the 355 California police agencies that contribute crime data to the DOJ UCR showed that only 21 police departments supported a SAR program (5.9%). The 355 agencies represent 77% of the total population of California, 29,270,474 of the 37,691,912. The population groupings from 10,000 to 249,999 represented 342 of the 355 agencies and 64.5% of the population. Within these groupings, only 15 of the 342 agencies supported a SAR website

program. The 250,000 to 499,999 group had the highest rate of SAR with five of nine agencies or 55.5 percent. Neither of the two cities in the 500,000 to 999,999 had an SAR program.

A secondary audit was conducted and verified the results of the website audit. Of the 355 California agencies, 117 (33%) were contacted and three or 2.6% provided a mechanism for the public to contact them directly to report suspicious activity related to terrorism.

The problem statement is much larger than first believed. A complete lack of SAR programs by California law enforcement agencies occurred regardless of agency size and population served. The near absence of SAR programs may be a large hole for this country's homeland security. California represents about 12% of the nation's population. The findings in California may be consistent with a much broader trend across all 50 states. Essentially, police departments in the United States have not adopted SAR programs.

The research concluded that of the 355 agencies, only 67 or 18.8% displayed a link on their website to a state, federal or local fusion center site where a SAR could be accessed. The public lacks an online resource through its local police department's websites to report suspicious activity related to terrorism or other criminal activity.

The research also concluded that 144 or 40.5% of the agencies supported an anonymous tip line on their website. The public could report suspicious behavior through the tip line, but it is not specific to terrorism. However, the larger majority of California police departments do not support a tip line on their website.

The research for this thesis has identified best practices to develop and implement a SAR program at police agencies in the country while meeting national standards and minimizing the organizational impacts. The recommendations assume that the law enforcement agency has made the decision to implement its own SAR program and will dedicate the resources to

act on information received through the SAR process in a timely manner. However, California police departments are not standing-up SAR programs. The gap in the literature exists at this juncture.

The Nationwide SAR Initiative, National Homeland Security Strategy documents, the Fusion Center Privacy Policy Development document, the Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report document and the SAR Process Implementation Checklist document assume that law enforcement agencies have the resources to support a SAR program. With that assumption, the documents provide a comprehensive methodology to initiate a SAR program. The documents do not provide recommendations for agencies that do not have the resources to sustain a SAR program. An alternative to those agencies is not provided. The research showed that in California, only 5.9% of the audited police departments have SAR programs. The literature does not address the other 94.1% of the agencies that do not have a SAR program and does not provide an alternative for those agencies.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Adopt a National SAR Model

The federal government through the DHS should adopt a centralized SAR system similar to the MPS of the United Kingdom and Israel. A comprehensive public awareness campaign would be a key component. Both the MPS and Israel have engaged in ongoing public education. The New York MTA, *If you see something, say something*, is an example of a model that may be appropriate.

The Israel National Police is the point of contact for SAR and all tips are received at the “Dial 100” telephone number. The same number serves the entire country. The National Police forward all terrorism-related tips to the Israeli Security Authority. A single source of input for the entire United States might coordinate all terrorism-related tips and better serve the country’s homeland security.

Another recommendation is that the DHS decentralize the national SAR model to the 73 fusion centers throughout the United States. The fusion centers would further decentralize by relying on local law enforcement to forward SAR-related information directly to the fusion center. Local law enforcement would partner with the fusion centers in the public awareness campaign and provide direct links on their websites to a fusion center SAR program. Law enforcement agencies that could manage their own SAR programs would not be prohibited. Since local law enforcement has not been able to adopt SAR programs, a system needs to be developed to allow the public a consistent venue to report suspicious activity.

2. Require National SAR Training for Law Enforcement

The NSI 15-minute SAR training video should be mandated for all law enforcement personnel. The video highlights how to recognize behaviors associated with pre-incident terrorism activities, how to document suspicious activities, and addresses civil liberties and privacy issues. The training video can also be viewed via the NSI website. The International Association of Chiefs of Police is currently involved in this endeavor. However, the training should be mandated. Agencies that do not comply could be subject to a loss of homeland security grant funding and could be a similar model to the training mandates required to receive federal reimbursements in the event of federal disaster support.

B. FUTURE RESEARCH

The research was confined to the state of California and resulted in the finding that an overall lack of SAR programs in California police departments exists. The findings were consistent among nearly all population groups and agencies size. Additional research should be conducted to determine if the California trend represents a broader national trend.

The research was an audit of 355 California police agency websites that represent 77% of the California population served by police departments. The research did not explore the factors why only 5.9% of the agencies support a SAR program. Additional research could include a survey of each of the agencies to determine other associated factors. For example, departments may be using other means to educate the public in suspicious activity and have adopted other types of reporting mechanisms. More importantly, the survey could inquire the reasons why departments are not supporting a SAR program.

Through the IACP, future research on a national level should include a survey to address additional questions not asked by this body of research. If the national findings are consistent with the California trend, then the homeland security field will need to address the fact that 5% of law enforcement agencies have SAR programs and lack a local mechanism for the public to report suspicious activity.

C. CLOSING

Homeland security is a shared responsibility between the public, governmental agencies and the private sector. The best opportunity for the country to prevent a terrorist attack is from reported observed suspicious behavior by a member of U.S. citizenry. Missed opportunities have occurred as evident of 9/11 hijackers taking pilot lessons in San Diego and other parts of the country. Successful intervention has been seen as with the attempted bombing of New York's Times Square by Faisal Shahzad. SAR programs provide a mechanism for the public to submit reports of observed suspicious criminal or terrorist activity to its local law enforcement agency.

This research began from the perspective that SAR programs lacked in the smaller police departments and were more prevalent in larger sized police departments. However, the findings were surprisingly different. Based on this research, the state of California, and possibly the broader context of the United States, is not engaged in the SAR strategy as desired. Members of the public do

not have access to report suspicious activity related to terrorism directly to their law enforcement agency of jurisdiction. Police departments are not educating the public in the signs and behaviors of suspicious terrorism activity.

Since terrorism can occur anywhere within U.S. borders, it is imperative that the American public recognize the signs of suspicious activity related to terrorism and know how and where to report the activity. Law enforcement at the local, state and federal level needs to be engaged in the SAR systems.

APPENDIX A. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT AUDIT

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
1	Agoura Hills-LASD		X			X	20,330
2	Albany		X			X	18,539
3	American Canyon						19,454
4	Anderson						9,932
5	Arcata					X	17,231
6	Arroyo Grande					X	15,851
7	Artesia-LASD		X			X	16,380
8	Arvin						12,956
9	Auburn		X				13,352
10	Avenal-Kings Cty SD						15,505
11	Barstow		X	X			22,639
12	Belmont					X	25,835
13	Blythe						20,817
14	Brawley						24,953
15	Calabasas					X	23,058
16	California City						
17	Canyon Lake-RSD						11,212
18	Carpinteria-SBSD		X			X	14,194
19	Chowchilla			X		X	13,077
20	Clayton						11,431
21	Clearlake-Lake Cty SD						15,250
22	Coalinga-LASD		X				11,668
23	Commerce		X			X	12,568
24	Corcoran						24,813
25	Cudahy						23,805
26	Desert Hot Springs		X			X	25,938
27	Dinuba						21,453
28	Duarte						21,321
29	El Cerrito		X			X	23,549
30	El Segundo		X			X	16,182

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
31	Exeter						9,973
32	Farmersville						10,078
33	Fillmore-VCSD					X	15,220
34	Fortuna		X	X			11,355
35	Galt		X				23,647
36	Grand Terrace-SBSD						12,040
37	Grass Valley			X			12,298
38	Greenfield		X				19,367
39	Grover Beach						13,200
40	Half Moon Bay-SMCSO	X	X			X	12,586
41	Hawaiian Gardens- LASD		X			X	15,186
42	Healdsburg					X	11,143
43	Hermosa Beach			X		X	19,506
44	Hillborough					X	10,825
45	Imperial						13,878
46	Kerman						14,500
47	King City						11,660
48	Kingsburg					X	11,257
49	La Canada Flintridge		X			X	20,246
50	La Palma						15,719
51	Laguna Beach					X	22,723
52	Laguna Woods-OCSD			X	X		18,234
53	Lemon Grove-SDSD		X	X	X	X	25,320
54	Lemoore		X	X		X	24,531
55	Lindsay						10,700
56	Livingston			X			13,368
57	Loma Linda - SBSD	X	X	X			23,261
58	Lomita - LASD		X			X	20,256
59	Los Alamitos			X	X		11,693
60	Malibu		X			X	13,042
61	Marina		X			X	25,041
62	Marysville						11,622
63	Mill Valley					X	13,404

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
64	Millbrae					X	21,532
65	Moraga						16,016
66	Morro Bay						10,391
67	Newman		X	X			10,182
68	Oakdale		X				20,675
69	Orinda					X	18,686
70	Oroville						14,660
71	Pacific Grove						14,637
72	Palos Verdes Estates						13,546
73	Parlier						13,331
74	Patterson-SCSD		X				20,413
75	Piedmont						10,572
76	Pinole					X	18,939
77	Placerville						10,095
78	Port Hueneme						21,555
79	Rancho Mirage						16,800
80	Red Bluff			X			13,795
81	Reedley						24,194
82	Ripon	X		X			14,738
83	Riverbank-SCSD		X				20,684
84	San Anselmo					X	12,058
85	San Fernando						23,645
86	San Marino						12,758
87	Sanger						24,270
88	Santa Fe Springs						16,263
89	Scotts Valley						11,266
90	Seal Beach					X	24,168
91	Selma			X			23,219
92	Shafter						15,911
93	Sierra Madre					X	10,786
94	Signal Hill		X				10,834
95	Solana Beach-SDSD		X	X	X	X	13,059
96	South El Monte-LASD		X			X	21,672

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 10,000–24,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
97	South Lake Tahoe						21,403
98	South Pasadena		X	X			25,619
99	Susanville						14,044
100	Truckee						16,260
101	Twin Cities						23,000
102	Ukiah						14,857
103	Yucca Valley	X	X	X			20,700

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 50,000–99,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
1	Alameda						75,409
2	Alhambra					X	87,299
3	Apple Valley-SBSD	X	X	X		X	70,109
4	Arcadia		X			X	56,202
5	Baldwin Park					X	77,078
6	Bellflower-LASD		X			X	72,862
7	Brentwood						49,708
8	Buena Park			X		X	82,768
9	Camarillo-VCSD		X	X		X	63,948
10	Carlsbad					X	98,402
11	Carson-LASD		X			X	92,255
12	Cathedral City						52,436
13	Cerritos-LASD		X			X	51,113
14	Chico						64,015
15	Chino Hills-SBSD	X	X	X		X	73,889
16	Chino					X	82,830
17	City of Murieta		X			X	58,392
18	Clovis			X			93,246
19	Colton		X				50,495
20	Compton-LASD		X			X	93,970

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 50,000–99,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
21	Cupertino-SCCSO		X	X			54,278
22	Davis					X	62,947
23	Delano						52,802
24	Diamond Bar-LASD		X			X	57,105
25	El Cajon		X			X	94,447
26	Encinitas-SDSD		X	X	X	X	61,593
27	Folsom		X	X		X	67,807
28	Fountain Valley					X	55,844
29	Gardena		X				58,363
30	Glendora		X				49,737
31	Hawthorne					X	83,945
32	Hemet			X			71,801
33	Hesperia		X			X	86,194
34	Highland-SBSD	X	X	X		X	51,002
35	Huntington Park						60,641
36	Indio		X			X	85,067
37	La Habra		X				59,410
38	La Mirada-LASD		X			X	49,752
39	Laguna Niguel-OCSD			X		X	64,812
40	Lake Forest-OCSD			X		X	60,793
41	Lakewood-LASD		X			X	78,097
42	Lamesa			X		X	55,547
43	Livermore	X				X	88,000
44	Lodi					X	61,450
45	Lynwood-LASD		X			X	69,755
46	Madera					X	56,692
47	Manteca		X				65,631
48	Merced		X			X	76,274
49	Milpitas		X			X	67,895
50	Mission Viejo-OCSD			X		X	94,651
51	Montebello						61,676
52	Monterey Park						61,571
53	Mountain view					X	72,222
54	Napa		X			X	75,279

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 50,000–99,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
55	National City					X	56,123
56	Newport Beach		X	X		X	72,521
57	Novato		X			X	53,449
58	Palo Alto					X	60,171
59	Paramount-LASD		X			X	55,018
60	Perris		X			X	56,118
61	Petaluma					X	55,178
62	Pico Rivera-LASD		X			X	62,895
63	Pittsburg					X	65,129
64	Placentia			X		X	49,938
65	Pleasanton		X			X	68,755
66	Rancho Santa Margarita -OCSD			X		X	49,458
67	Redding			X			90,521
68	Redlands		X			X	69,976
69	Redondo Beach					X	66,711
70	Redwood City			X		X	74,508
71	Rocklin		X			X	53,572
72	Rosemead-LASD		X			X	54,272
73	San Clemente-OCSD			X		X	61,610
74	San Leandro		X			X	81,466
75	San Mateo					X	92,791
76	San Rafael		X			X	55,901
77	San Ramon					X	49,548
78	Santa Barbara		X			X	86,353
79	Santa Cruz		X				56,810
80	Santa Maria						86,931
81	Santa Monica					X	87,563
82	Santee-SDSD		X	X	X	X	55,341
83	South Gate						96,285
84	South San Francisco		X			X	62,830
85	Temecula						76,107
86	Tracy			X		X	79,235
87	Tulare						57,521
88	Turlock		X			X	68,712

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 50,000–99,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
89	Tustin					X	72,539
90	Union City		X				73,402
91	Upland				X		72,974
92	Vacaville		X				91,991
93	Walnut Creek		X			X	64,008
94	Westminster	X	X	X		X	89,547
95	Whittier		X			X	81,877
96	Woodland					X	55,270
97	Yorba Linda-Brea PD		X				66,120
98	Yuba City			X		X	42,492
99	Yucaipa	X	X	X		X	50,022

Suspicious Activity Reporting: 100,000–249,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
1	Antioch					x	102,232
2	Berkeley						112,580
3	Burbank					x	103,340
4	Chula Vista					x	243,916
5	Concord					x	122,067
6	Corona					x	151,037
7	Costa Mesa					x	109,960
8	Daly City		x			x	101,123
9	Downey		x			x	111,772
10	El Monte						113,475
11	Escondido		x			x	143,911
12	Fairfield					x	108,321
13	Fontana					x	196,069
14	Fremont					x	214,089
15	Fullerton					x	135,161
16	Garden Grove				x	x	170,883
17	Glendale		x			x	191,719

Suspicious Activity Reporting: 100,000–249,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
18	Hayward					x	144,186
19	Huntington Beach						189,992
20	Inglewood		x			x	109,673
21	Irvine					x	212,375
22	Lancaster	x	x			x	156,633
23	Modesto		x			x	201,165
24	Moreno Valley					x	186,365
25	Norwalk						105,549
26	Oceanside					x	183,095
27	Ontario					x	163,924
28	Orange		x				136,416
29	Oxnard					x	197,899
30	Palmdale		x			x	152,750
31	Pasadena		x				137,122
32	Pomona		x			x	149,058
33	Rancho Cucamonga		x			x	165,269
34	Rialto		x			x	100,000
35	Richmond					x	102,000
36	Roseville		x			x	118,788
37	Salinas		x			x	150,441
38	San Bernardino		x				209,924
39	Santa Clara			x		x	116,468
40	Santa Clarita		x			x	176,320
41	Santa Rosa						167,815
42	Simi Valley					x	124,237
43	Sunnyvale					x	140,081
44	Thousand Oaks					x	126,683
45	Torrance					x	145,438
46	Vallejo						115,942
47	Ventura					x	106,433
48	Victorville						115,903
49	Visalia		x			x	124,442
50	West Covina		x				106,098

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 250,000–499,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
1	Anaheim	x	x		x	x	365,463
2	Bakersfield	x	x	x	x	x	347,483
3	Fresno	x	x			x	510,365
4	Long Beach	x	x			x	462,257
5	Oakland					x	390,724
6	Riverside						303,871
7	Sacramento	x	x	x	x	x	466,488
8	Santa Ana						324,528
9	Stockton					x	291,707

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: 500,000–999,999							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
1	San Francisco		x			x	805,235
2	San Jose		x			x	945,942

Suspicious Activity Reporting Population: One Million +							
	Agency	SAR on Department Website	Tipline on Department Website	Link to Federal, State SAR Fusion Center	Terrorism Prevention Information	Crime Prevention Information	Population
1	Los Angeles	X	X	X	X	X	3,792,621
2	San Diego					X	1,301,607

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APPENDIX B. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT AUDIT #2

Population 10,000-24,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
American Canyon		
Arroyo Grande		
Auburn		
Belmont		
Calabasas		
Carpinteria		
Clearlake		
Corcoran		
Dinuba		
El Segundo		
Fillmore		
Grand Terrace		
Grover Beach		
Healdsburg		
Imperial		
Kingsburg		
Laguna Beach		
Lemoore		
Loma Linda		
Malibu		
Mill Valley		
Morro Bay		
Orinda		
Palos Verdes Estates		
Piedmont		
Port Hueneme		
Reedley		
San Anselmo		
Sanger		
Seal Beach		
Sierra Madre		
South El Monte		
Susanville		
Ukiah		

Population 25,000-49,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
Atascadero		
Banning		
Bell Gardens		
Brea	X	
Campbell		
Coachella		
Culver City		
Danville		
El Centro		
Gilroy		
Hercules		
Lake Elsinore		
La Verne		
Lompoc		
Los Gatos		
Maywood		
Montclair		
Morgan Hill		
Oakley		
Palm Springs Pleasant Hill		
Rancho Palos Verdes		
Rohnert park		
San Dimas		
San Juan Capistrano		
Santa Paula		
Soledad		
Temple City		
Watsonville		
Windsor		

Population 50,000-99,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
Apple Valley		
Bellflower		
Camarillo		
Cathedral City		

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
Chino Hills		
Clovis		
Cupertino		
Diamond Bar		
Folsom		
Glendora		
Hesperia		
Indio		
Laguna Nigel		
Lamesa		
Lynwood		
Merced		
Montebello		
Napa		
Novato		
Perris		
Pittsburg		
Rancho Santa Margarita		
Redondo Beach		
Rosemead		
San Mateo		
Santa Barbara		
Santa Monica		
South San Francisco		
Tulare		
Union City		
Walnut Creek		
Woodland		
Yucaipa		

Population 100,000-249,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
Burbank		
Corona		
Downey	X	
Fairfield		
Fullerton		
Hayward	x	

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
Irvine		
Moreno Valley		
Ontario		
Palmdale		
Rancho Cucamonga		
Roseville		
Santa Clara		
Simi Valley		
Torrance		
Victorville		

Population 250,000-499,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
Fresno		
Riverside		
Stockton		

Population 500,000-999,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
San Francisco		

Population 500,000-999,999

Agency	Dedicated Phone Line	Other Dedicated Means of Reporting
San Diego		

APPENDIX C. FUSION CENTER LOCATIONS

A. PRIMARY FUSION CENTERS

- a. Alabama Fusion Center
- b. Alaska Information and Analysis Center
- c. Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center
- d. Arkansas State Fusion Center
- e. California State Threat Assessment Center
- f. Colorado Information Analysis Center
- g. Connecticut Intelligence Center
- h. Delaware Information Analysis Center
- i. Florida Fusion Center
- j. Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center
- k. Hawaii Pacific Regional Information Clearinghouse
- l. Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center
- m. Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center
- n. Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center
- o. Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center
- p. Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center
- q. Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center
- r. Louisiana State Analytical & Fusion Exchange
- s. Maine Information and Analysis Center
- t. Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center
- u. Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center
- v. Michigan Intelligence Operations Center
- w. Minnesota Joint Analysis Center
- x. Mississippi Analysis and Information Center
- y. Missouri Information Analysis Center
- z. Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center
- aa. Nebraska Information Analysis Center
- bb. New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center
- cc. New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center
- dd. New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center
- ee. New York State Intelligence Center
- ff. North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center
- gg. North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center
- hh. Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center
- ii. Oklahoma Information Fusion Center
- jj. Oregon Terrorist Information Threat Assessment Network
- kk. Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center
- ll. Puerto Rico National Security State Information Center
- mm. Rhode Island Fusion Center
- nn. South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center

- oo. South Dakota Fusion Center
- pp. Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center (Las Vegas, Nevada)
- qq. Tennessee Fusion Center
- rr. Texas Fusion Center
- ss. Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center
- tt. Vermont Fusion Center
- uu. Virginia Fusion Center
- vv. Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center (Washington, D.C.)
- ww. Washington State Fusion Center
- xx. West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center
- yy. Wisconsin Statewide Information Center
- zz. Wyoming Fusion Center

B. RECOGNIZED FUSION CENTERS

- a. Boston Regional Intelligence Center; Boston, MA
- b. Central California Intelligence Center; Sacramento, CA
- c. Central Florida Intelligence Exchange; Orlando, FL
- d. Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center; Chicago, IL
- e. Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group; Cincinnati, OH
- f. Delaware Valley Intelligence Center; Philadelphia, PA
- g. Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center; Detroit, MI
- h. Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center; Houston, TX
- i. Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning Interagency Analysis Center; Kansas City, MO
- j. Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center; Los Angeles, CA
- k. Nevada Threat Analysis Center; Carson City, NV
- l. North Central Texas Fusion Center; McKinney, TX
- m. Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center; Cleveland, OH
- n. Northern California Regional Intelligence Center; San Francisco, CA
- o. Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center; Fairfax, VA
- p. Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center; Orange County, CA
- q. San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego, CA
- r. Southeast Florida Fusion Center; Miami, FL
- s. Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center; Milwaukee, WI
- t. Southwestern PA Region 13 Fusion Center, Pittsburgh, PA
- u. St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group; St. Louis, MO

APPENDIX D. FUSION CENTER TRAINING MASTER CALENDAR

Tallahassee, Florida - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204

1. Monday, January 10, 2011 to Friday, January 14, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

San Antonio, Texas - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent Terrorism AWR-158

1. Monday, January 10, 2011 to Friday, January 14, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Ewing, New Jersey - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204

1. Monday, January 10, 2011 to Friday, January 14, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Colorado - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Wednesday, January 19, 2011 to Wednesday, January 19, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Georgia - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Wednesday, January 26, 2011 to Wednesday, January 26, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Florida - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, January 27, 2011 to Thursday, January 27, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Louisiana - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Monday, January 31, 2011 to Monday, January 31, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Nashville, Tennessee - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA)

1. Monday, January 31, 2011 to Friday, February 04, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Jefferson City, Missouri - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT)
AWR-204

1. Monday, January 31, 2011 to Friday, February 04, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Mississippi - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Wednesday, February 02, 2011 to Wednesday, February 02, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Fairmont, West Virginia - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One

1. Monday, February 07, 2011 to Friday, February 11, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Las Vegas, Nevada - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204

1. Monday, February 07, 2011 to Friday, February 11, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Ventura, California - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One

1. Monday, February 14, 2011 to Friday, February 18, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Illinois - Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Polices (28 CFR Part 23)
Training

1. Tuesday, February 15, 2011 to Tuesday, February 15, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Illinois - Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Polices (28 CFR Part 23)
Training

1. Wednesday, February 16, 2011 to Wednesday, February 16, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Nevada - Intelligence Commanders Course

1. Wednesday, February 16, 2011 to Thursday, February 17, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Manager/Commander
3. Contact: Jennifer Turner
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Indianapolis, Indiana - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-
204

1. Monday, February 28, 2011 to Friday, March 04, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

California - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Tuesday, March 01, 2011 to Tuesday, March 01, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

California - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, March 03, 2011 to Thursday, March 03, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Columbus, Ohio - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent Terrorism
AWR-158

1. Monday, March 07, 2011 to Friday, March 11, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Houston, Texas - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA)

1. Monday, March 14, 2011 to Friday, March 18, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Lincoln, Nebraska - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One

1. Monday, March 21, 2011 to Friday, March 25, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Woodlawn, Maryland - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT)
AWR-204

1. Monday, March 21, 2011 to Friday, March 25, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Michigan - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, March 31, 2011 to Thursday, March 31, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Oriskany, New York - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent
Terrorism AWR-158

1. Monday, April 04, 2011 to Friday, April 08, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Utah - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Tuesday, April 05, 2011 to Tuesday, April 05, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Scotch Plains, New Jersey - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One

1. Monday, April 11, 2011 to Friday, April 15, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Pennsylvania - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Tuesday, April 12, 2011 to Tuesday, April 12, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Missouri - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Tuesday, April 12, 2011 to Tuesday, April 12, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Virginia - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Thursday, April 14, 2011 to Thursday, April 14, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Massachusetts - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, April 14, 2011 to Thursday, April 14, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Wichita, Kansas - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204

1. Monday, April 18, 2011 to Friday, April 22, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Amarillo, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence

1. Monday, April 18, 2011 to Tuesday, April 19, 2011
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic Criminal Intelligence
3. Contact: Ken Sanz
4. Phone: 727.639.1263

Alabama - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, April 21, 2011 to Thursday, April 21, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Scotch Plains, New Jersey - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA)

1. Monday, April 25, 2011 to Friday, April 29, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Texas - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Tuesday, April 26, 2011 to Tuesday, April 26, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Alaska - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Wednesday, April 27, 2011 to Wednesday, April 27, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Fairmont, West Virginia - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204

1. Monday, May 02, 2011 to Friday, May 06, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Nashville, Tennessee - LEIU/IALEIA Annual Training Conference

1. Monday, May 02, 2011 to Friday, May 06, 2011
2. Training Category: Topic-Specific Intelligence Training
3. Contact: Bob Morehouse
4. Phone: (916) 704-4949

Indianapolis, Indiana - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent Terrorism AWR-158

1. Monday, May 09, 2011 to Friday, May 13, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Lansing, Michigan - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204

1. Monday, May 23, 2011 to Friday, May 27, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Helena, Montana - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA)

1. Monday, May 23, 2011 to Friday, May 27, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

North Carolina - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Monday, May 23, 2011 to Monday, May 23, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Oregon - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, May 26, 2011 to Thursday, May 26, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Texas - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Wednesday, June 01, 2011 to Wednesday, June 01, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

New York, New York - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One

1. Monday, June 06, 2011 to Friday, June 10, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Missouri - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Wednesday, June 08, 2011 to Wednesday, June 08, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Missouri - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, June 09, 2011 to Thursday, June 09, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Waunakee, Wisconsin - Financial Records Examination & Analysis (FREA)

1. Monday, June 13, 2011 to Friday, June 17, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Texas - Intelligence Commanders Course

1. Tuesday, June 14, 2011 to Wednesday, June 15, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Manager/Commander
3. Contact: Jennifer Turner
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Lakewood, Colorado - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent Terrorism AWR-158

1. Monday, June 20, 2011 to Friday, June 24, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Iowa - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, June 23, 2011 to Thursday, June 23, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

Columbus, Ohio - Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) AWR-204

1. Monday, June 27, 2011 to Friday, July 01, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Woodlawn, Maryland - Analyst's Notebook V8 Level One

1. Monday, June 27, 2011 to Friday, July 01, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

Florida - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Wednesday, June 29, 2011 to Wednesday, June 29, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

San Marcos, TX, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence

1. Tuesday, July 12, 2011 to Thursday, July 14, 2011
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic Criminal Intelligence
3. Contact: REGISTRAR
4. Phone: 1-800-803-6532

Missouri - SAR Analytic Role Training

1. Thursday, July 14, 2011 to Thursday, July 14, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Contact: Denise Reeder
4. Phone: 850 385 0600

McAllen, TX, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence

1. Tuesday, July 19, 2011 to Wednesday, July 20, 2011
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic Criminal Intelligence
3. Contact: Shane Bonnet
4. Phone: 210 452-0135

Amarillo, TX, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence

1. Tuesday, August 02, 2011 to Thursday, August 04, 2011
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic Criminal Intelligence
3. Contact: REGISTRAR
4. Phone: 1-800-803-6532

Houston, Texas - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence

1. Tuesday, August 09, 2011 to Thursday, August 11, 2011
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic Criminal Intelligence
3. Contact: Susan Krueger
4. Phone: (281) 372-5857

Georgia - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Wednesday, August 17, 2011 to Wednesday, August 17, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Des Moines, Iowa, - Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence

1. Wednesday, September 07, 2011 to Friday, September 09, 2011
2. Training Category: General Law Enforcement Officer – Basic Criminal Intelligence
3. Contact: registrar
4. Phone: 800-803-6532

Tennessee - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Thursday, September 08, 2011 to Thursday, September 08, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Des Moines, Iowa, - Intelligence - Connecting the Dots

1. Monday, September 19, 2011 to Friday, September 23, 2011
2. Training Category: Topic-Specific Intelligence Training
3. Contact: Registrar
4. Phone: 800-803-6532

California - Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties

1. Tuesday, September 20, 2011 to Tuesday, September 20, 2011
2. Training Category: Criminal Intelligence Officer
3. Contact: Stephanie Roeser
4. Phone: (850) 385-0600

Lansing, Michigan - Advanced Criminal Intelligence Analysis to Prevent Terrorism AWR-158

1. Monday, October 24, 2011 to Friday, October 28, 2011
2. Training Category: Intelligence Analyst
3. Phone: 877-628-7674

APPENDIX E. NCRIC TRAINING CALENDAR

June 2012	July 2012	August 2012	September 2012
June 13-14, 2012; Wednesday - Thursday Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorist Acts San Francisco, CA	July 10-11, 2012; Tuesday - Wednesday Enhanced Threat and Risk Assessment Training San Francisco, CA	August 01, 2012 - Wednesday Basic Concealed Compartment Training San Francisco, CA	
June 19, 2012 - Tuesday ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (Wiretap) San Francisco, CA	July 12, 2012 - Thursday Awareness and Response to Biological Events San Francisco, CA	August 02, 2012 - Thursday Basic Concealed Compartment Training San Francisco, CA	
June 28-29, 2012; Thursday - Friday SEARCH WARRANTS "A THROUGH Z Oakland, CA	July 12-13, 2012; Thursday - Friday SEARCH WARRANTS "A THROUGH Z Corcoran, CA	August 14-16, 2012; Tuesday - Thursday Transit Terror Tactics and Tools Dublin, CA	
June 29, 2012 - Friday FBI's LE Officers Killed and Assaulted(LEOKA) Napa, CA	July 13, 2012 - Friday Screening of Persons by Observational Techniques (AWR-219) 1st Class San Francisco, CA		

June 2012	July 2012	August 2012	September 2012
	<p>July 13, 2012 - Friday Screening of Persons by Observational Techniques (AWR-219) 2nd Class San Francisco, CA</p>		
	<p>July 18, 2012 - Wednesday TLO Basic Course Napa, CA</p>		
	<p>July 18-19, 2012; Wednesday - Thursday Threat and Risk Assessment Training San Francisco, CA</p>		
	<p>July 19, 2012 - Thursday TLO Basic Course San Mateo, CA</p>		
	<p>July 24, 2012 - Tuesday Active Shooter Workshop San Francisco, CA</p>		

Table 12. NCRIC TRAINING CALENDAR (From: Northern California Regional Intelligence Center and Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, n.d.)

APPENDIX F. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRAINING CALENDAR

June 2012

Date /Time	Course	Title	Location
June 11 - 12, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER-233/MGT- 348 <i>closed</i>	Medical Preparedness and Response to Bombing Incidents ***Course Cancelled***	Valhalla, NY
June 11, 2012 8:30 am - 4:30 pm	EOCC	NYS Emergency Operations Center Course	Albany, NY
June 12, 2012 8:30 am - 3:30 pm	D-LAN	Disaster-Lan for EOC Personnel 8.0.4	Albany, NY
June 12 - 13, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER - 275	Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response *** Lodging Available ***	Oriskany, NY
June 12, 2012 8:00 am - 4:30 pm	How to Hunt Criminals and Terrorists	"How to Hunt" Criminals and Terrorists: The Actionable Intelligence Workshop	Albany, NY
June 12-13, 2012 8:30 am - 4:30 pm	I-400 <i>closed</i>	ICS For Major and/or Complex Incidents ***Course Full ***	Hornell, NY
June 13, 2012 8:00 am - 4:30 pm		Counter Surveillance for Law Enforcement & Analysts	Albany, NY

Date /Time	Course	Title	Location
June 19, 2012 6:00 pm - 8:00 pm	AWR-130-C	Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (Conference)	Oriskany, NY
June 19 - 21, 2012 8:30 am - 5:00 pm	I-300	Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents	Fulton, NY
June 20 - 21, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	MGT-324	Executive Seminar: Prevention of, Response to, and Recovery From Campus Emergencies	Albany, NY
June 26 - 27, 2012 8:30 am - 4:30 pm	I-400	ICS For Major and/or Complex Incidents	Ithaca, NY
June 26 -28, 2012 8:30 am - 5:00 pm	I-300 <i>closed</i>	Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents ***Course Closed ***	Syosset, NY
June 26 - 27, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER - 275	Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response *** Lodging Available ***	Oriskany, NY
June 26, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	MGT-338	Risk and Vulnerability Assessments for Rural Communities	Alexandria Bay, NY

July 2012

Date /Time	Course	Title	Location
July 6, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER-275-C <u>Announcement</u> <u>Register</u>	Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response Refresher Pilot ***Lodging Available***	Oriskany, NY

Date /Time	Course	Title	Location
July 9 - 12, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm July 13, 2012 8:00 am - 12:00pm	Large Vehicle Bomb Post Blast School	Large Vehicle Bomb Post Blast School *** Lodging Available ***	Fort Drum, NY
July 10-11, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER-275	Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response *** Lodging Available ***	Oriskany, NY
July 11, 2012	ADVANCED HURREVAC	National Hurrican Program - Advanced Course	Yaphank, NY
July 11, 2012 8:30 am - 4:30 pm	EOCC	NYS Emergency Operations Center Course	Albany, NY
July 12, 2012 8:30 am - 3:30 pm	D-LAN 8.0.4	Disaster-LAN for EOC Personnel 8.0.4	Albany, NY
July 12, 2012	HURREVAC BASIC	National Hurrican Program - Basic Course	Brooklyn, NY
July 13, 2012	ADVANCED HURREVAC	National Hurrican Program - Advanced Course	Brooklyn, NY
July 13, 2012 9:00 am - 4:00 pm	Advanced HURREVAC	National Hurricane Program - Advanced Course	Brooklyn, NY
July 18, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	AWR-147	Rail Car Incident Response Course *** Lodging Available ***	Oriskany, NY
July 24-26, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER-213	Wide Area Search and Rescue *** Lodging Available ***	Oriskany, NY
July 24, 2012 1:00 am - 5:00 pm	PER-275	Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response	Oriskany, NY

Date /Time	Course	Title	Location
July 25, 8:00 am - 5:00 pm July 26, 8:00 am - 12:00 pm		*** Lodging Available ***	
July 25, 2012 8:00 am - 5:00 pm	AWR-160	WMD Awareness Training *** Lodging Available ***	Oriskany, NY
July 30 - August 1, 2012 8:30 am - 5:00 pm	I-300	Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents	Goshen, NY
July 31, 2012 - August 2, 2012	SD-LES	Surveillance Detection for Law Enforcement and Security Professionals	Oriskany, NY

August 2012

Date /Time	Course	Title	Location
August 2-3, 2012 8:30 am - 4:30 pm	I-400	ICS For Major and/or Complex Incidents	Goshen, NY
August 13, 15, 20, 22, 27, 29, 2012 6:00 pm - 10:00 pm All Nights	I-300	Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents	Clarence Center, NY
August 22, 2012 8:30 am - 3:30 pm	D-LAN	Disaster-Lan for EOC Personnel 8.0.4	Lockport, NY

Table 13. New York State Office of Homeland Security Training Calendar
(From: New York State, n.d.b.)

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